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I. INTRODUCTION
The lawyer as a negotiator is assuredly one of the most significant roles
that an attorney will play during the course of his career. The act of
negotiation itself is a pervasive element of an attorney's practice;
commercial contracts, settlement agreements and employment contracts.
must all be negotiated. Even the lawyer's relationships with both his clients
and his associates can be determined in large part by the negotiations that
take place between them.' Furthermore, the growing concern about the
adversary system's ability to deal with disputes quickly, fairly and
economically has led to an increased interest in a wide variety of alternative
dispute resolution methods.2 Negotiation has become the most often used
and relied upon method for resolving disputes in an efficient and cost-
effective way.
Despite the prevalence of negotiation in the practice of an attorney,
comparatively few ethical rules have been created to directly address the
role of an attorney in the process of negotiation.3 One commentator asserts
that "negotiators operate under primitive and obtuse rules of professional
responsibility and under an amorphous set of professional mores common
among lawyers." 4 Still others fear that negotiation, without significant
ethical constraints to counteract the absence of judges and a formal
adjudication process, creates controversial outcomes that rely more upon
power and status than principled resolution.5 Because of the lack of specific
ethical rules dealing with this area, numerous academics and practitioners
1 See CHARLEs B. CRAVER, EFEcnrvE LEGAL NEGOTATION AND SETLMENT 1-2
(2ded. 1993).
2 See Walter W. Steele, Jr., Deceptive Negotiating and High-Toned Morality, 39
VANi). L. REv. 1387, 1387 (1986).
3 See discussion infra Section III.
4 Steele, supra note 2, at 1387.
5 See Eleanor Holmes Norton, Bargaining and the Ethic of Process, 64 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 493, 497 (1989) (citing Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality:
Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV.
1359, 1400).
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have urged the adoption of additional rules of professional responsibility
that would more directly constrain the lawyer as negotiator. 6
While there has been a call for higher ethical standards for attorneys in
this area, this Note will show that current rules provide adequate protection
for the various competing interests involved in the negotiation process.
Section II of this Note discusses the ethical rules that currently apply to
attorneys while they are engaged in negotiation. More specifically, it shows
how both the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the Model Code of
Professional Responsibility ethically restrain the attorney as a negotiator.
Section m provides some of the proposed additions to the rules of
professional responsibility that have been suggested and articulates both the
practical and professional rationales that have been offered in support of
them. Section IV illustrates how the current ethical restraints, acting
together with both professional considerations and market forces, are
adequate restrictions on the behavior of attorneys acting in the negotiation
setting. Finally, Section V reinforces this view by providing a market-type
analysis of attorney conduct in negotiation. In addition, it demonstrates,
through hypothetical situations, that additions to the current ethical
standards would be superfluous and unnecessary in today's legal
community.
II. THE CURRENT ETHICAL CONSTRAINTS ON LAWYERS AS
NEGOTIATORS
Despite the prevalence of the negotiating process in the life of an
attorney, 7 very few ethical rules across the country directly address this
aspect of a lawyer's life. This is not to say, however, that modem ethical
rules do not have an indirect and significant influence on an attorney's
negotiating behavior. Both the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
6 See, e.g., Robert B. Gordon, Private Settlement as Alternative Adjudication: A
Rationale for Negotiation Ethics, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 503 (1985) (presenting a
rationale for imposing duties of truthfulness on a lawyer negotiating a private settlement
that are coextensive with an advocate's duty of candor towards the tribunal); Alvin B.
Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyers' Ethics in Negotiation, 35 LA. L. REv. 577, 589 (1975)
(calling for fairness in negotiations); Michael H. Rubin, The Ethics of Negotiation: Are
There Any?, 56 LA. L. REv. 447 (1995); Steele, supra note 2, at 1403.
7 "Negotiated settlement is universally recognized as the preeminent and preferred
alternative to trial litigation." Gordon, supra note 6, at 504-505 (citing SAMUEL D.
THURMAN Er AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TE LEGAL PROFESSION 250 (1970)).
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(Model Rules) and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Model
Code)8 set up an ethical framework that can act as a guide for attorney
behavior when conducting negotiations with third parties.
A. Ethical Constraints on Attorney Conduct
The Model Code has been noted by scholars as relying heavily on the
adversarial process, and it constrains attorneys' behavior with respect to
negotiations in the same manner. Under the Model Code, zealous advocacy
of the client "within the bounds of the law" is the touchstone concept. 9 As
a result, the reliance on this key principle permeates both the Ethical
Considerations and Disciplinary Rules contained throughout the Model
Code. The Model Rules also value the attorney's duty to be a zealous
advocate for his client, stating in its preamble that "[als negotiator, a
lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client but consistent with
requirements of honest dealing with others." 10
Where the bounds of the law are uncertain, the ethical boundaries of
the lawyer may depend on whether he is serving as an advocate or advisor.
A lawyer may serve simultaneously as both advocate and advisor, but the
two roles are essentially different." Model Code Canon 7, in its Ethical
Considerations, states that while serving as advocate, a lawyer should
8 Jurisdictions are split on following the Model Rules or the Model Code, with the
vast majority of states (excluding Ohio) electing to follow the American Bar
Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See Laws. Man. on Prof. Conduct
(ABA/BNA) 01:3-01:4 (May 29, 1995).
9 Model Code Canon 7 provides in pertinent part: "A lawyer should represent a
client zealously within the bounds of the law." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
REsPONsEBrrY Canon 7 (1980).
10 MODEL RULEs OF PROFE SIONAL CoNDucT Preamble cmt. 2 (1995).
11 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-
Settlement and Rulemaldng, 89 HARv. L. REv. 637 (1976). Eisenberg states:
Nowhere does the contrast between official processes and their private
counterparts appear greater than between adjudication and negotiation.
Adjudication is conventionally perceived as a norm-bound process centered on the
establishment of facts and the determination and application of principles, rules,
and precedents. Negotiation... is conventionally perceived as a relatively norm-
free process centered on the transmutation of underlying bargaining strength into
agreement ....
Id. at 638. See also Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1073
(1984).
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resolve doubts as to the bounds of the law in favor of his client.12
Similarly, the Model Rules subordinate, in large part, a requirement of
honest dealing in negotiation to the ideal of an attorney's zealous advocacy
of his client.
Generally, an attorney has no affirmative duties to non-client third
parties. Responsibility to his client and the duty to zealously represent him
require a lawyer to subordinate the interests of others to those of his
client.13 This is a conscious policy decision made by the drafters of both the
Model Rules and Model Code to insure that those needing representation
by a member of the legal profession can acquire the strongest advocate for
their interests.' 4 Any deviation from this current norm would jeopardize the
coveted attorney-client relationship and change the role of an attorney from
that of an advocate to one of "social- policeman." This reliance on the
strong protection of the attorney-client relationship displays itself in other
areas of professional responsibility. Most notably, this can be seen in the
fundamental area of confidentiality. Almost without exception, the lawyer
is charged with maintaining the confidentiality of information relating to the
representation of a client.' 5 Clients are thereby encouraged to communicate
fully and frankly with their lawyers even as to embarrassing or legally
damaging subject matter. 16 The observance of this ethical obligation
facilitates the full development of facts essential to the proper
representation of the client and encourages people to seek early legal
assistance. Much like confidentiality, the primary duty of an attorney to
zealously represent his client's interests serves the same function. Only by
closely tying clients to their attorneys and assuring clients of their
attorneys' utmost loyalty can the proper and most efficient representation
take place.
From the general duty of zealous representation comes one of the most
important areas of negotiation ethics: misrepresentation. 17 Generally, an
attorney may not misrepresent any material fact. For example, Rule 4.1(a)
12 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REspoNsIBILrY EC 7-1 (1980).
13 See CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLIY, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
ANNOTATED MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCr 439 (2d ed. 1992).
14 See id.
15 See CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsmLTY, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
supra note 13, at 85.
16 See id.
17 See HON. EUGENE F. LYNCH ET AL., NEGOTIATION AND SETrLEMENT 170
(1992).
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of the Model Rules forbids a lawyer to knowingly "make a false statement
of material fact or law to a third person. .... " 18 However, Comment 2 of
Rule 4.1, interpreting this rule, states an important qualification:
This Rule refers to statements of fact. Whether a particular statement
should be regarded as one of fact can depend on the circumstances. Under
generally accepted conventions in negotiations certain types of statements
ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact. Estimates of price
or value placed on the subject of a transaction and a party's intentions as
to an acceptable settlement of a claim are in this category .... 19
Thus, by custom, attorneys are permitted (and even expected) to
misrepresent to some extent not only what their clients would find
acceptable, but also the extent of their own authority to settle. This issue
lies at the heart of the dichotomy facing attorneys when entering
negotiations with the highest "utopian" views of their ethical duties-that
"[t]o mislead an opponent about one's true settling point, is the essence of
negotiation." 20 Thus, interpreting the rule, one may say that his client will
not accept or authorize less than a certain figure while knowing the
statement is not true. But one may not say falsely that the loss to his client
exceeds a certain figure. 21 A leading text on negotiation gives these simple
words of advice: "When in doubt ... either tell the truth, decline to give a
value, or generalize. But do not lie. "22
While this distinction may seem to contravene the underlying attempt to
promote ethical behavior, it also promotes one of the most important ideals
in professional responsibility-confidentiality. At the heart of this
controversy over a lawyer's duty of truthfulness is the tension between the
duty to maintain client confidences, 23 and the obligation to refrain from
assisting fraudulent or dishonest conduct of a client.24 Both the Model Code
18 MODEL RuLus OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 4.1(a) (1995); see also MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrY DR 7-102(A)(3), DR 7-102(A)(5) (1980)
(stating that a lawyer shall not "knowingly conceal or fail to disclose that which he is
required by law to reveal ... [or] knowingly make a false statement of law or fact.").
19 MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 4.1(a) cmt. 2 (1995).
20 James J. White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in
Negotiation, 1980 AM. B. FouND. REs. J. 926, 928 (1980).
21 See LYNCH ET AL., supra note 17, at 170.
22 Id. (emphasis added).
23 See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFEsSIONAL RESPONSmmT DR 4-101(B) (1980).
24 See id. at DR 1-102(A)(4).
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and the Model Rules make a policy judgment and resolve this conflict in
favor of protecting privileged communications. 25 "Thus, any duty of
candor or truthfulness that may exist in the negotiation context clearly
yields to the duties of loyalty and zealous representation owed the client."26
In addition, numerous other ethical constraints indirectly restrict an
attorney's conduct while acting as a negotiator. For example, Model Code
EC 7-10 maintains that lawyers should "treat with consideration all persons
involved in the legal process .... "27 Also, Model Rule 2.1 allows lawyers
to consider moral issues in rendering their advice.28 However, the
professional responsibility rules do not offer much more in the form of
guidance with respect to negotiation ethics. Both the Model Rules and
Model Code deal largely with ethical constraints regarding actions before a
tribunal. Neither set of ethical rules has chosen to directly interfere with the
predominantly informal process of negotiation that occurs in the day-to-day
activities of a practicing attorney.
B. ABA Rejection of Specific Rules Governing Negotiation Behavior
The fact that neither the Model Rules nor Model Code deals directly
with the problems of an attorney as a negotiator is not the result of mere
oversight or ignorance on the part of the American Bar Association (ABA).
25 Model Code DR 4-101(C) permits a lawyer to discuss a client's confidences or
secrets in only four narrow circumstances: (1) when the client consents (either explicitly
or impliedly); (2) when permitted by a Disciplinary Rule or required by law; (3) when
necessary to prevent a crime intended by the client; and (4) when necessary to establish
or collect his fee or to defend himself against an accusation of wrongful conduct. See
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBLTY DR 4-101(C) (1980).
Model Rule 1.6(b) likewise obligates a lawyer to maintain client secrets, except
when necessary to prevent the client from committing a criminal act likely to result inimminent death or substantial bodily harm, or except when necessary to defend himself
against allegations relating to the representation of his client. See MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 1.6(b) (1995). Rule 1.6(b) is explicitly subordinate to
those provisions in the Model Rules requiring truthfulness in statements to others. See
id.
26 Gordon, supra note 6, at 506-507.
27 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-10 (1980).
28 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucT Rule 2.1 (1995) ("In
representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment and
render candid advice. In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to
other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be
relevant to the client's situation.").
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When the Model Rules were drafted, the ABA specifically rejected rules
requiring absolute truth and fairness in negotiations.2 9 Rules 4.2 and 4.3 of
the January 30, 1980 Discussion Draft of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct dealt with the role of the lawyer as negotiator:
Rule 4.2 Fairness to Other Participants
(a) In conducting negotiations a lawyer shall be fair in dealing with other
participants.
Rule 4.3 Illegal, Fraudulent or Unconscionable Transactions
A lawyer shall not conclude an agreement, or assist a client in concluding
an agreement, that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is illegal,
contains legally prohibited terms, would work fraud or would be held to
be unconscionable as a matter of law. 30
However, the Model Rules today contain no requirement of honest
dealing. As stated earlier, the Model Rules as finally adopted "reflect a
tension between maintaining the attorney-client privilege and determining
under what circumstances an attorney can reveal otherwise privileged
communications." 31 Model Rule 1.6, as proposed, required an attorney to
reveal communications the lawyer reasonably believed necessary "to
prevent the client from committing a ... fraudulent act that the lawyer
reasonably believe[d was] likely to result in ... substantial injury to the
financial interests or property of another .... "32 This rule did not treat
privileged information as an absolute bar; an attorney was required to
speak out to prevent substantial financial injury to another even if the client
desired that the information not be revealed. "This rule, as proposed,
enshrined the concept of fair dealing." 33 The proposed fair dealing
language was deleted, however, because the drafters feared that the
proposed Model Rule would create too many inherent conflicts and
2 9 See CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT: THEIR
DEV ELOPMENT IN THE ABA HOUSE OF DELEGATES [hereinafter THE LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT] 145 (1987).
30 ROY D. SIMON, JR. & MuRRAY L. SCHWARTZ, LAWYERS AND THE LEGAL
PROFESSION 180 (3d ed. 1994).
31 Michael H. Rubin, supra note 6, at 452.
32 THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT,
supra note 29, at 48.
33 Michael H. Rubin, supra note 6, at 452.
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transform the lawyer "into a 'policeman' over a client." 34 These two
separate and deliberate decisions by the ABA clearly show its desire not to
interfere with the relatively informal negotiation process, and to leave it up
to the profession to regulate and constrain its own behavior.35
MI. CALLS FOR HIGHER STANDARDS FOR ATTORNEYS AS
NEGOTIATORS
The lack of ethical constraints dealing directly in the area of negotiation
has caused a number of academics and practitioners to call for specific
additions to both the Model Rules and Model Code. 36 The exact changes
that each would propose to adopt varies, but the common underlying thread
rests upon the belief that a form of good faith and fair dealing obligation
needs to be imposed in order to insure that attorneys engage in negotiations
ethically37. Obviously, underlying this belief is the perception-perhaps
misplaced-that the current ethical constraints imposed upon attorneys,
both formal and informal, are completely inadequate.
First and foremost, it is important to illustrate exactly what provisions
are being proposed as solutions to this perceived lack of proper ethical
constraint in the negotiation process. As a possible solution, one professor
has suggested the following duty be imposed upon attorneys acting as
negotiators:
Obligation of Fairness and Candor in Negotiation:
When serving as an advocate in court a lawyer must work to achieve
the most favorable outcome for his client consistent with the law and the
admissible evidence. However, when serving as a negotiator lawyers
should strive for a result that is objectively fair. Principled negotiation
between lawyers on behalf of clients should be a cooperative process, not
an adversarial process. Consequently, whenever two or more lawyers are
negotiating on behalf of clients, each lawyer owes the other an obligation
34 THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCr,
supra note 29, at 48.
35 This assumes the absence of egregious conduct. See discussion infra Section
II.A.
36 See supra note 6.
37 For an argument that a good faith and fair dealing duty should be imposed on
precontractual negotiations, see Nicola W. Palmieri, Good Faith Disclosures Required
During Precontractual Negotiations, 24 SEroN HALL L. REv. 70 (1993).
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of total candor and total cooperation to the extent required to insure that
the result is fair.38
Presumably, in the eyes of their drafters, ethical standards such as this
would go far toward insuring that overall negotiation processes would be
relatively free from both deceit and "power-determinative" outcomes.
A. Professional Considerations
One of the greatest concerns that has prompted commentators to urge
upon attorneys a higher standard of ethics during negotiation rests upon the
belief that lawyers have a separate duty toward their profession. 39 This duty
rests not upon the belief that attorneys have presumed advantages of
education and social status; rather, this duty stems from the concept that,
"as professionals, lawyers serve society's interests by participating in the
process of achieving the just termination of disputes." 40 Following this line
of reasoning, most would assert that an attorney's professional duties would
not allow him to do anything that his client might do under the same or
similar circumstances. In other words, a lawyer must be at least as candid
and honest as his client is required to be and must not perpetrate the kind of
fraud or deception that would vitiate a bargain if practiced by his client.
Beyond this minimal level of attorney conduct, commentators argue
that the profession should embrace the same affirmative ethical standard for
38 Steele, supra note 2, at 1403 (emphasis added). See also Alvin B. Rubin, supra
note 6, at 589-591 (asserting that there are two precepts that should guide the lawyer's
conduct in negotiations: honesty and good faith; and that a lawyer may not accept a
result that is unconscionably unfair to the other party); supra notes 30-32 and
accompanying text. According to one commentator:
If you would not do something in a courtroom context, if you would not make a
misleading statement in a settlement conference with a judge, and if you would not
remain silent about a misstatement made by your client or partner during
discussions in court chambers or in open court, then you should not do any of these
things in non-litigation negotiations, whether or not they take place prior to or after
the filing of a lawsuit.
Michael H. Rubin, supra note 6, at 476. But see Charles P. Curtis, The Ethics of
Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REv. 3 (1951); White, supra note 20, at 927 ("The critical
difference between those who are successful negotiators and those who are not lies in
[the] capacity both to mislead and not to be misled.").
39 See Alvin B. Rubin, supra note 6, at 589.
40 Id.
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attorneys' professional relationships with courts, other lawyers and the
public. 41 The rationale asserted for proposing this standard is that an
attorney who deals with another member of his profession should be able to
secure in the fact that his opponent is constrained by a principle of good
conduct that is "morally binding" on the conscience of that individual. 42 It
is felt that applying this sort of honesty and good faith duty would allay
fears such as those expressed by Eleanor Holmes Norton:
The Model Rules do not exempt negotiation from ethical constraints,
but neither are the rules drafted to address the demands of bargaining with
the same specificity that they address the demands of litigation. No rule or
law requires fairness during negotiation .... In negotiation, where there
is only the sparsest written guidance, the parties must decide for
themselves what is legal, what is factual and what is ethical. 43
In short, commentators fear that with no specific, articulated rules of
ethical conduct, attorneys would manipulate the rules of their behavior
much like they were changing the rules of a game. It is this potential
treatment of the negotiation atmosphere as merely a game-where ethical
constraints can be shaded and altered according to perception-that have
prompted commentators to press for a higher level of professional
responsibility in this area.
It has also been suggested, as part of the overall obligation to negotiate
fairly and in good faith, that attorneys "may not accept a result that is
'unconscionably unfair' to the other party." 44 Much like its commercial
counterpart with respect to contracts,45 an unconscionable settlement may
result from a variety of circumstances. For instance, there may be such a
41 See id.
42 See id.
43 Norton, supra note 5, at 529 (citations omitted).
44 Alvin B. Rubin, supra note 6, at 591.
45 See U.C.C. § 2-302 (1995). The basic test for a commercial contract is whether,
in light of the general commercial background and the commercial needs of a particular
trade or case, the clauses involved are so one-sided as to be unconscionable under the
circumstances existing at the time of the making of the contract. See id. off. cmt. 1.
Under U.C.C. § 2-302, courts may pass directly upon the unconscionability of a
contract at the time it was made and decide, if appropriate, to (1) refuse to enforce the
contract, (2) enforce the remainder of the contract without a particular contract or clause
or (3) limit the application of any unconscionable clause to avoid an unconscionable
result. See id. § 2-302(1).
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vast difference in the bargaining power of the principals that, regardless of
the adequacy of representation, one party may not be able to withstand the
expense of a protracted dispute or lawsuit.46 In addition, there may be such
a discrepancy in the bargaining skills of counsel that one is able to virtually
manipulate the other at his will. Thus, an unconscionable result achieved
under these circumstances would be created at least in part by the relative
power, knowledge and skill of the principals and their negotiators. It is
feared by commentators that attorneys, in attempts to "zealously represent
their client, and possibly strengthen their own reputation, will always strive
to exploit these balances of inherent bargaining power to the detriment of
the 'optimal' social outcome of any given negotiation."47 Furthermore, it is
believed that imposing affirmative duties to tell the truth and bargain in
good faith would "reduce any relative inequality and produce results that
commentators view as 'within relatively tolerable bounds.'" 48
In addition to evaluating the relative strength of the principals and
negotiators involved, part of determining whether a particular negotiated
agreement is "unconscionably unfair" must necessarily rest upon the result
alone. In the eyes of Judge Rubin, there comes a time when a deal is "too
good to be true, where what has been accomplished passes the line of
simply-a-good-deal and becomes a cheat." 49 Thus, an attorney would have
an affirmative duty not to accept agreements where the burden upon the
opponent is "so unbearable that it represents a sacrifice of value that an
ethical person cannot in conscience impose upon another. "50
B. Practical Considerations
One of the predominant practical arguments for heightening the ethical
duties imposed upon attorneys-from those in negotiation to that imposed
before a tribunal in litigation-rests upon a comparison of the two separate
settings. It is argued that "[niegotiation of private settlements, like formal
litigation, takes root in a set of circumstances giving rise to the assertion of
rights by one party against another." 51 Lawyers come to the bargaining
46 See SIMON & SCHwARTz, supra note 30, at 168.
47 Alvin B. Rubin, supra note 6, at 591.
48Id.
49 Id. at 591-592.
50 Id.
51 Gordon, supra note 6, at 514.
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table, however, in an effort to avoid the cost and stress of trial.52
Unfortunately, in many cases, when negotiation fails, litigation results.
With a potential trial acting as an ever-present backdrop for the negotiation
proceedings, lawyers will often negotiate in a manner that contemplates
litigation. 53 In negotiation, each attorney bargains with a "persuasive
prediction of what a court would do were the case litigated, and from the
confrontation of arguments emerges what the parties believe is a fair
agreement. "54
Taking the comparison one step further, it is asserted that the lawyers
involved offer versions of the facts in much the same way witnesses would
at trial. Lawyers interpret facts and offer legal arguments for assigning or
avoiding liability as they would in trial advocacy. They evaluate the legal
merit of arguments like judges. 55 "And ultimately, based upon a concerted
interpretation of the facts as governed by the applicable law, they decide
who should pay whom and how much." 56 Given this proposed structure of
the negotiation process, "lawyers achieve in settlement something far more
significant than a resolution of conflict. They may determine the substantive
legal rights of the parties, replacing [a] jury verdict with an alternative
adjudication." 57 Thus, although the style and procedural format of litigation
distinguish it from the relatively informal nature of private settlement
negotiation, 58 the objectives and corresponding methodologies of the two
processes are quite similar.59 Thus, it has been asserted that, because of the
52 See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Lawyer's Obligation to be Trustworthy When
Dealing with Opposing Parties, 33 S.C. L. REv. 181, 187 (1981).
53 See Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 664-665.
54 Gordon, supra note 6, at 514-515. Note that this theoretical analysis could also
apply to precontractual negotiations as well, where individual negotiators can bargain
over how they believe courts would interpret their contractual terms and precontractual
behavior. See Bartlett A. Jackson & Auban Ann Eisenhardt, Negotiations in
Commercial Cases: Assess-Advise-Advocate, 5 LrrIG. 32 (1978) (describing the
negotiation process as anticipatory trial advocacy).
55 See Roger Fisher, Comment, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 120, 122 (1984).
56 Gordon, supra note 6, at 516.
57 Id.
58 See Eisenberg, supra note 11, at 653-660.
59 See Marc Galanter, Worlds of Deals: Using Negotiation to Teach About Legal
Process, 34 J. LEGAL EDUc. 268 (1984).
On the contemporary American legal scene the negotiation of disputes is not
an alternative to litigation. It is only a slight exaggeration to say that it is litigation.
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close similarity between the two processes, the same ethical constraints
should be imposed upon both litigation and negotiation. 6°
Furthermore, there are commentators that base their belief in higher
levels of negotiation ethics on the inherent differences between the two
processes of negotiation and litigation. Settlement and negotiation both call
for advocacy, but different from the kind required before a tribunal. The
advocate in negotiation presents his facts and arguments to the other party
for agreement, rather than to a tribunal for a decision. "The difference is
best perceived in terms of the assumptions that underlie advocacy in the
judicial process of litigation and those which underlie the private process of
negotiation." 61 Litigation, it is argued, "assumes an irreconcilable conflict
between the parties, that one party is wholly at fault, that one party must
win, and that the end of the dispute is more important than the 'right'
decision."62 Negotiation, in contrast, "assumes that the parties desire to
reach an agreement, that each is fair-minded and willing to be convinced,
that each will yield to a more reasonable view advanced by the other, and
that the right decision requires a coordination of interests for their mutual
benefit. "63
This differentiation between negotiation advocacy and trial advocacy is
offered in an effort to show that negotiation is more accommodating and
less adversarial in nature, and that lawyers in the negotiation setting should
thus be held to a higher standard of ethics.64 For example, it is asserted that
the negotiator in the office and the advocate in the courtroom have two
entirely different functions to perform, each of which requires a different
standards. "The negotiator is dealing with the other party not as a plaintiff
or a defendant, but as an individual person whose cooperation is desirable,
and perhaps essential, to the best interest of his client." 65 According to this
There are not two distinct processes, negotiation and litigation; there is a single
process of disputing in the vicinity of official tribunals that we might call litigation,
that is, the strategic pursuit of a settlement through mobilizing the court process.
Id. at 268-269.
60 See Gordon, supra note 6, at 504.
6 1 L. RAY PATTERSON & ELLiOT E. CHEATHAM, THE PROFESSION op LAw 121
(1971).
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 See Gordon, supra note 6, at 515 n.62 (citing PATTERSON & CHEATHAM, supra
note 61, at 123).
65 PA1rRON & CHEATHAM, supra note 61, at 123.
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line of thinking, there is only one basic standard for the lawyer's role as a
negotiator honesty. 66
In support of this differentiation between litigation and negotiation
behavior, a useful basketball analogy has been offered.67 An official
basketball game is conducted with the understanding that a third party will
referee and adjudicate the legality of conduct exhibited by the players.
Within this situation, players are free to flirt with the edges of acceptable
conduct to gain an advantage over their respective opposition. They can do
this secure in the knowledge that flagrant or egregious violations of the
rules will be adjudicated and punished by an impartial third party. This has
been asserted to be analogous to an attorney's conduct before a tribunal. In
this setting, a lawyer has an explicit set of rules and an impartial third party
to referee his conduct. Therefore, an attorney may flirt with the ethical and
procedural boundaries, free to rely upon the third party to check any
conduct that society would deem either illegal or unethical. 68
This situation is markedly different from an informal "pick-up"
basketball game where no referees are present. Under these circumstances,
the individual players need the cooperation and support from both their
partners and adversaries in order to insure an organized activity. As a
result, players have the responsibility of policing each other to insure that
the rules are not violated. Thus, it is argued that players, in doing so,
curtail their own behavior and place greater constraints upon themselves in
order to enjoy the greater good of the game. The flirting with boundaries of
acceptable conduct is replaced by participants acting safely within the
boundaries of acceptable behavior to insure a more ordered and "ethical"
game. This can be analogized to the negotiation setting, where the third-
party tribunal is no longer present. It is here in this informal situation,
much like the "pick-up" basketball game, that a greater set of ethical rules
is argued to be necessary. With no ethical rules and no tribunal to referee
their conduct, attorneys would be able to exercise conduct clearly outside
the lines of acceptable ethical behavior.69
66 See id.
67 See Thomas B. Metzloff, Seeing the Trees Within the Forest: Contextualized
Ethics Courses as a Strategy for .Teaching Legal Ethics, LAW & CoMNM,. PROBs.,
Summer/Autumn 1995, at 227, 234-237.
68 See id.
69 See id.
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IV. THE STATUS Quo AS AN ADEQUATE CONSTRAINT
Proponents of instituting stronger ethical rules on attorneys as
negotiators have asserted a number of valid points in defense of their
position. However, it seems that an incomplete understanding of the reality
of the situation and all of its externalities lies deeply imbedded in their
views.
A. Creation of Higher Ethical Standards for Negotiators Would Be
Problematic
Standing firmly in the center of all disputes surrounding the ethical
constraints imposed upon negotiators is the dilemma that these individuals
face daily in their practice. This problem was addressed effectively in
Professor White's article on negotiation ethics:
On one hand the negotiator must be fair and truthful; on the other he
must mislead his opponent. Like the poker player, a negotiator hopes that
his opponent will overestimate the value of his hand. Like the poker
player, in a variety of ways he must facilitate his opponent's inaccurate
assessment. The critical difference between those who are successful
negotiators and those who are not lies in this capacity both to mislead and
not to be misled .... [A] careful examination of the behavior of even the
most forthright, honest, and trustworthy negotiators will show them
actively engaged in misleading their opponents about their true positions..
To conceal one's true position, to mislead an opponent about one's true
settling point, is the essence of negotiation.70
However, despite this reality, some commentators still would propose
ethical rules outlawing deceptive statements that were natural-even
necessary- elements of the negotiation process.
Some of the criticisms of deceptive negotiating tactics to further client
interests get their impetus from the belief that such deceptive devices
diminish the likelihood of Pareto optimal results,71 because "deception
70 White, supra note 20, at 926-930.
71 The Pareto efficient point is defined as the point of allocation of resources where
one person cannot make himself better off without making the other worse off. See
ANDREW ALTMAN, ARGUING ABouT THE LAW 153 (1996). For a more detailed
explanation of this and other related concepts, see discussion infra Section V.
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tends to shift wealth from the risk-averse to the risk-tolerant." 72 Even
though this position is inevitably true from a practical standpoint, it is
unlikely to discourage the predominant use of ethically permissible tactics
that are designed to deceive risk-averse opponents into believing that they
must accept less beneficial terms than they must actually accept.73 Thus, it
is unproductive to discuss a "utopian negotiation world" in which complete
disclosure is the norm.74 Arguably, making negotiations objectively fair
and requiring complete and honest disclosure would break down the very
essence of the informal negotiation process. The real question that should
govern the debate surrounding truthfulness in negotiations concerns the
types of deceptive practices that may ethically be employed to enhance
bargaining interests.75 Attorneys who naively believe that no deception is
proper during bargaining encounters place themselves and their clients at a
distinct disadvantage, because they permit their less candid opponents to
obtain settlements and "transcend the terms to which they are objectively
entitled." 76
These important exceptions appropriately recognize that deceptive
behavior is indigenous to most legal negotiations and could not realistically
be prevented because of the nonpublic nature of most bargaining
interactions. 77 Although the Model Rules unambiguously proscribe all
lawyer deception, they reasonably permit mere "puffing" and dissembling
regarding one's true minimum position.78 The fact that negotiation is
nonpublic behavior would make any specific ethical rules extremely
difficult to accept and monitor. If one negotiator lies to or deceives another
in direct conflict with an "honesty and good faith" duty, only by chance
will the other discover the deception. If the settlement is concluded by
72 Geoffery M. Peters, The Use of Lies in Negotiation, 48 OHo ST. L.J. 1, 7
(1987).
73 See CRAVER, supra note 1, at 310.
74 Id. at 310-311.
75 See generally, e.g., Norton, supra note 5; Peters, supra note 72 (arguing that
there exists an ethical difference between lies, which are prohibited, and other forms of
deceptions, which are not); Gerald Wetlaufer, The Ethics of Lying in Negotiations, 75
IOWA L. REv. 1219 (1990).
76 CRAVER, supra note 1, at 311 (citing Wetlaufer, supra note 75, at 1230).
77 See id. at 312.
78 See RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL REsPONSmiBUY 151 (West 1984);
Gary Lowenthal, A General Theory of Negotiation Process, Strategy, and Behavior, 31
KANsAS L. REV. 69, 101 (1982); see also discussion supra Section II.
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negotiation, there will be no trial, no public testimony by conflicting
witnesses and thus no opportunity to examine the truthfulness of the
assertions made during the negotiation. 79 Consequently, in negotiation,
more than in other contexts, ethical norms can probably be violated with
greater confidence that there will be no discovery or punishment. Whether
one is likely to be caught for violating a possible ethical standard says
nothing about the merit of the standard. However, if the low probability of
punishment means that many lawyers will violate the standard, the standard
itself becomes even more difficult for the honest lawyer to follow. By doing
so, the honest lawyer may be forfeiting a significant advantage for his client
to others who do not follow the rules.8 0
Another difficulty in drafting ethical norms is the gigantic scope of
disputes that are subject to resolution by negotiation. Surely society would
realistically expect and tolerate different forms of behavior from different
negotiation situations. Performance that is standard in one negotiating arena
may be considered tactless or conceivably unethical in another. More than
any other form of behavior that attorneys engage in, the process of
negotiation is varied; it differs in time, place and subject matter. It calls,
therefore, either for different rules in different contexts or for rules stated
only at a very high level of generality.81
Finally, any attempt to assert new ethical norms in the arena of legal
negotiations must tackle the significant obstacle of enforcement. And for
those that have proposed the imposition of a fairness standard, that obstacle
seems insurmountable. For example, Professor Rubin admits that any
attempt to evaluate his "unconscionably unfair" standard must necessarily
involve an examination of the actual results of the negotiation 82. To most
observers, however, imposing such an objective ethical standard would be
practically impossible.8 3 Furthermore, stepping up the level of monitoring
would be akin to making negotiations more like a "tribunal" and remove
many of the benefits that have made it such an attractive informal dispute
resolution mechanism.84
7 9 See White, supra note 20, at 927.
80 See id. at 928.
81 See id.
82 Professor Rubin describes his unconscionably unfair standard as "whether the
lesion is so unbearable that it represents a sacrifice in value that an ethical person cannot
in conscience impose upon another." Alvin B. Rubin, supra note 6, at 591-592.
83 See Gordon, supra note 6, at 528.
84 See id. at 520-521.
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B. Current Ethical and Legal Constraints Adequately Check
Unethical Conduct
Even though attorney deception during legal negotiations does not
always result in disciplinary action, courts have not been reluctant to take
action when attorneys engage in questionable negotiation activity. Lawyer
deception in negotiation can and does lead to discipline, to vacatur of
settlement and to liability for fraud. For example, in State ex rel. Nebraska
Bar Association v. Addison,85 a lawyer negotiating the settlement of a
client's hospital bill was found to have had a duty to tell the hospital
administrator that his client had insurance potentially able to pay his bill. 86
Also, in Virzi v. Grand Trunk Warehouse & Cold Storage Co., 87 a
Michigan court vacated a settlement where a plaintiff's attorney, knowing
the defendant believed plaintiff would make an excellent trial witness,
negotiated a final settlement agreement without disclosing that his client had
died.88 So while disciplinary and court actions against unethical attorney
behavior in negotiations are not frequent, courts clearly have not hesitated
to act against particularly egregious attorney conduct.8 9
Practitioners must also recognize that other risks are created by truly
dishonest bargaining behavior. "Attorneys who deliberately deceive
opponents or who withhold information they are legally obliged to disclose
85 412 N.W.2d 855 (Neb. 1987).
86 See id.
87 571 F. Supp. 507 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
88 See id.
89 See Slotkin v. Citizens Cas. Co., 614 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1979) (holding defense
lawyer liable for fraud in settlement of medical malpractice suit; the lawyer stipulated
that "to the best of his knowledge" there was no excess insurance coverage when his
client's files, which were in law firm's possession during trial, included letters from the
excess carriers); Price v. Superior Court, 139 Cal. App. 3d 518 (1983) (holding defense
counsel had duty to disclose to prosecutor that co-prosecutor had already refused plea
bargain defense counsel was proposing). Compare Kerwit Med. Prods. v. N & H
Instruments, Inc., 616 F.2d 833 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding failure of plaintiff in patent
infringement action to notify defendant of facts on which defendant could have
fashioned a defense of invalidity did not amount to "fraud" such as would warrant
vacatur of settlement), with Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962)
(vacating settlement of personal injury case where defendant's lawyer did not report an
aneurysm that the defense's physician discovered in analyzing plaintiff becase the duty
to disclose arose once parties sought court approval of settlement).
628
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may be guilty of fraud." 9° Contracts procured through fraudulent acts of
commission or omission, as well as those that are deemed unconscionable
by law, may be voided with the responsible advocates and their clients
possibly liable for monetary damages. 91 In addition, "it would be
particularly embarrassing for lawyers to make misrepresentations that could
cause their clients additional legal problems transcending those the
attorneys were endeavoring to resolve."92
Because the adversely affected clients might thereafter sue their
culpable former counsel for legal malpractice, the ultimate injury to the
reputations and practices of the deceptive attorneys could be monumental. 93
Legal representatives who employ clearly improper bargaining tactics may
even subject themselves to judicial sanctions. 94
C. Professional Constraints on Unethical Negotiating Behavior
Most legal representatives conduct their negotiations with appropriate
candor and without abusing their potential positions of power because they
are moral individuals or believe that such professional behavior is already
mandated by the applicable ethical standards. 95 For those who do not feel
so ethically constrained, they would be wise to consider the practical
professional risks associated with unquestionably deviant bargaining
conduct.
Even if deceitful or "unconscionably unfair" action on the part of an
attorney is not clearly unethical, is never reported to the state bar and never
results in personal liability for fraud or legal malpractice, practical
consequences often result.96 It is likely that their aberrational behavior will
eventually be discovered by their fellow practitioners in what is often
considered a tightly-knit legal community. As other attorneys begin to
realize that particular lawyers are not minimally trustworthy, future
90 CRAVER, supra note 1, at 312-313.
91 See Rex R. Perschbacher, Regulating Lawyers' Negotiations, 27 AiZ. L. REv.
75, 86-94 (1985); Alvin B. Rubin, supra note 6, at 587.
92 CRAVER, supra note 1, at 313.
93 Perschbacher, supra note 91, at 81-86, 107-112.
94 See, e.g., Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1985) (en
banc).
95 See CRAVER, supra note 1, at 313.
96 See id.
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interactions become more difficult for those practitioners. 97 For example,
oral representations on the telephone and handshake arrangements are no
longer acceptable, and executed documents are required even for the
simplest of matters. More importantly, opposing negotiators will become
more wary and distrustful of their opponents, making it more difficult for
those who have gained a reputation as an "unethical" negotiator to obtain
cooperative results for their clients in the long-term future. 98
Attorneys who contemplate the employment of unacceptable deception
to further present interests should always be cognizant of the fact that such
near-sighted conduct may seriously jeopardize their future careers. "No
short-term gain achieved through deviant behavior should ever be permitted
to outweigh the likely long-term consequences of those improper
actions. " 9
V. A MARKET VIEW OF ATToRNEY CoNDucT
One of the most important developments in legal thought during the last
part of this century has been the application of economics to an ever-
increasing range of legal fields and subjects. 100 While subject to a wide
variety of criticism from its very inception, the economic analysis of the
law has managed to attract steadily growing interest, both academic and
professional. 101 Taken one step further, the descriptive aspect of "law and
economics " 102 is extremely useful in analyzing attorney behavior and
showing that the current ethical rules, along with practical and professional
97 See J. KEnH MURNIGHAN, BARGAINING GAMES 230-231 (William Morrow ed.,
1992).
98 See Robert J. Condlin, Bargaining in the Dark: The Normative Incoherence of
Lawyer Dispute Bargaining Role, 51 MD. L. REv. 1, 78-80 (1992).
99 CRAVER, supra note 1, at 314.100 See RIcHARD A. POSNER, EcoNoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW xix (1992)
101 See id.
102 ALTMAN, supra note 71, at 149-150. There are three separate theses belonging
to the law and economics approach: the descriptive, the explanatory and the evaluative.
The descriptive thesis holds that economic concepts and principles provide illuminating
descriptions of legal rules and action. The explanatory maintains that economic concepts
provide the best explanations for society's legal rules. Finally, the evaluative holds that
economic principles provide sound criteria for evaluating legal rules and determining
which ones are fit for society. See id.
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constraints, are adequate to insure ethical attorney conduct during
negotiations.
Rationality is one of the main concepts at the center of how the
economic approach describes and explains human actions and institutions.
From the view of economists, human action is essentially rational, and the
rationality of any particular action is a product of that action's resulting
costs and benefits. 10 3 Costs and benefits include, but are not limited to,
monetary gain or loss. Various considerations that are nonmonetary can be
marginalized and given a unit of measurement in order to evaluate its affect
on cost-benefit analysis. 104
"According to the economic approach, each individual is the ultimate
judge of what makes her better or worse off." 105 And, in the case of the
attorney, they oftentimes have the duty of evaluating action that may or
may not make their client better off. In other words, each person's
preferences determine what counts as a cost or benefit for him. Thus,
rational decisions reflect the net benefits of the decision (i.e., they reflect
the gains (benefits) minus the losses (costs)). By focusing on marginal costs
and benefits, one can determine when he has maximized his net benefits. 106
In the case of a negotiation, an attorney who contemplates a specific course
of action or settlement proposal implicitly evaluates the costs and benefits
involved, both to himself and his client, and will take that action when it
maximizes his net benefit.
Proponents of new ethical constraints pertaining to negotiation conduct
seem to have a pessimistic view of how attorneys evaluate their own
conduct. In their minds, they see attorneys as a class evaluating negotiating
decisions along strict lines that take into consideration only narrow short-
term benefits to their clients and themselves. In other words, they seem to
think that attorney behavior is mostly motivated by getting the largest fee
possible and getting the best possible deal for one's client. Consequently, it
is no wonder that this view of an omnipresent self-interest in the minds of
attorneys has caused the proponents to suggest more constraints on their
conduct.
In reality, the types of costs and benefits that attorneys must consider
when evaluating their negotiation behavior is much greater. For example,
103 See id. at 150-151 ("[closts and benefits refer to the entire range of
considerations that make something better or worse for an individual.").
104 See id. at 150.
105 Id.
106 See id. at 151.
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when an attorney decides to accept a negotiated contract that is
"unconscionably unfair," although not legally unconscionable, he has
several ramifications that he should consider. While certainly this contract
will have net benefits in the short-run, the same may not be true in the
long-run. Opposing parties subject to such contracts will tend to either (1)
perform the minimal obligations to the contract when they might have
performed more out of good faith, or (2) breach the contract because the
losses that the contract imposes are too great. In either event, each will
result in greater costs (i.e., litigation costs or lost benefits) incurred by the
client in the long run. Furthermore, any chance of a long-term relationship
that is beneficial to both sides beyond the term of the contract may be
negated by such an initially lopsided agreement. All of these costs are to be
considered by the practicing attorney when evaluating whether or not to
impose such terms upon an opponent, thus shifting the way in which the net
benefits are determined.
Existing rules, although not as all-encompassing as desired by some,
act as a deterrent to questionable behavior through the rational
decisionmaking process. In most situations in life, it is not certain what the
gains or losses will be from any given choice or action. Rational choice
under such conditions or uncertainty is handled using the concept of
expected benefits (or losses). The expected benefit of a choice is simply the
benefit multiplied by the probability of its occurrence. 10 7 For example, if
there is a ten percent chance of receiving ten dollars, then the expected
benefit would be one dollar (.10 x $10 = $1). Most economists would
assert that this idea of rational action provides a good approximation of
much human conduct, applicable across the spectrum of human
activities.108 Thus, this theory can be applied to the negotiator who engages
in questionably ethical conduct. Every time an attorney behaves in such a
way as to call the current ethical rules into question, there is the probability
that his action will be construed as unethical, requiring disciplinary
sanctions. 109 Clearly, an attorney deceiving another during negotiation may
face this problem. The more egregious his deception, the more likely it will
be interpreted as fraud and the greater the possibility of facing reprimand.
Therefore, attorneys must consider this as a cost in determining what type
of behavior they will engage in when negotiating. And while deceptive
107 See id. at 152.
108 See J. ROLAND PENNOCK, ETHIcs, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW 109 (J. Roland
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1982).
109 See id.
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action that is quite far removed from incurring penalties carries with it an
equally small probability of being sanctioned, it has an effect as a liability
in a cost-benefit analysis.
Finally, attorneys must consider long-term, professional consequences
of their actions. No decision made during negotiations is limited to the
parties at issue. Given a relatively small and tightly-knit legal community,
it is likely that a lawyer will face either the same opponent in the future, or
at least one who has knowledge of his reputation. Thus, deceptive or
power-motivated practices in the present will cause future negotiation
opponents to look more warily upon them and to be less likely to engage in
conciliatory negotiations. This works to hurt both the attorney as a
professional and his future clients that he must represent. As a result,
lawyers must take into consideration these potential long-term costs or face
the consequences that their actions will reap in the future.
A. Practical Application
1. Hypothetical 1110
Lawyer represents Client, who was injured in an automobile accident. The
Client's problems include a severe back injury. Lawyer, however, is not
aware that Client sustained the back injury in a previous accident.
Opposing counsel is likewise unaware of the earlier accident, and fails to
learn of it during discovery. Lawyer files a complaint alleging that the
present accident is the proximate cause of Client's back injury, and, still
unaware of the injury's true origin, he begins negotiation. Before a
settlement is reached, Lawyer learns of the earlier accident.111
The author of the hypothetical, applying the Model Code, correctly
concluded that the lawyer must counsel the client to correct the
misrepresentation. 112 However, beyond that level of action on behalf of the
attorney, Lawyer would not ethically be able to disclose the prior accident
without Client's consent, because the information was acquired in the
110 See John L. Adams, Comment, The Proposed Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility: Disclosure of Clients' Fraud in Negotiation, 16 U.C. DAviS L. REv.
419, 430 (1983).
I11 Gordon, supra note 6, at 508 (quoting Adams, supra note 110, at 430).
112 See id; see also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPoNsmriTY DR 7-
102(B)(1) (1980).
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course of representation and is thus a privileged communication.113 In
addition, because continued representation of Client would violate the duty
not to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation, 114 Lawyer would be obliged to withdraw from the
representation." 5 And when Client attempted to retain another attorney to
handle his case, he would most assuredly neglect to inform his new counsel
about his previous injury. Thus, from this it is argued that the current
system is flawed and allows negative conduct such as this to go unchecked.
However, this argument tends to ignore a few practical checks and
ramifications. First, if Attorney attempts to engage in negotiations based
upon what he knows, it is possible that he will be found to have violated
Model Rule 4.1 by making an intentional misstatement of a known fact to a
third party, for which he can be disciplined. Furthermore, his refusal to
answer questions pertaining to any previous accident involving his client
for fear of violating Model Rule 1.6 will likely alert opposing counsel to
possible misstatements on behalf of Client. Also, it is bordering on
incompetence on the part of opposing counsel not to (1) thoroughly
research Client's history and story, or (2) fail to question Attorney about
the source of Client's injuries. The ramifications of such poor work on
opposing counsel's part will likely result in either (1) making that attorney
more thorough and astute during future engagements, or (2) costing that
attorney future business among potential clients through word-of-mouth
recommendations.
Even assuming in the worst case scenario, where, despite all of the
potential checks in the current system, this type of conduct were to get
through in this particular instance, the ramifications of altering these rules
permitting disclosure would be disastrous. Developing a system where
attorneys could be bound to reveal client confidences in such informal
settings as negotiation would go far towards breaking down the attorney-
client relationship. Clients would no longer feel that they could fully
confide in their attorneys, knowing that possible disclosures to them, no
matter how private, embarrassing or legally detrimental, could easily be
disclosed under a "duty of honesty" rule in attorney conduct. In this
hypothetical, imposing this new rule would do nothing but assure that
Client would never allow Attorney to learn of the previous injuries in the
113 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPoNsiBIUTY DR 4-101(B)(1) (1980);
Adams, supra note 110, at 430.
114 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIlrTY DR 1-102(A)(4) (1980).
115 See Adams, supra note 110, at 430.
[Vol. 13:2 1998]
ETHICAL CONSTRAINTS ON NEGOTIATORS
first place. Even by limiting such a duty to only the realm of negotiations,
the proverbial slippery slope would work slowly to erode the ideals of
confidentiality and zealous representation that have become the touchstones
of the legal profession.
2. Hypothetical 2
Lawyer (L) represents a large, well-established manufacturer (M) that
produces widgets. Opposing counsel (OC), a young and inexperienced
attorney, works for a small, upstart company (P) that produces an
intermediate material necessary for M's production of widgets. While a
number of producers perform the same function as P, P has developed and
patented a new system that produces the intermediate material more
cheaply and efficiently at a higher level of quality.
M desires to enter into a supply contract with P and instructs L to
meet with OC to negotiate such a contract with the "most favorable terms
he can acquire." Given M has much more economic power than P and L
has much more skill at negotiating than OC, Lawyer proceeds to dictate
the contractual terms to OC in creating the supply contract. In the end, a
contract is agreed upon that is patently unfair and virtually negates any
competitive market advantage that P held by virtue of its new production
system.
At first glance, this would seem to be a situation where an added
ethical fairness duty directed at negotiation would be appropriate.
Assuming that this "lopsided" outcome was not unconscionable as a matter
of law under the Uniform Commercial Code, 116 it would appear to be
appropriate for the ethical rules to step in and prevent such an unbalanced
result from occurring. Applying the "unconscionably unfair" standard, 117
Lawyer would arguably be found guilty of violating this ethical constraint.
He would suffer punishment at the hands of the appropriate ethical board,
thus serving as a model to deter future conduct of such an "egregious"
nature. In essence, it is asserted by commentators that a fairness rule such
as the one addressed here would effectively prevent attorneys from
engaging in such questionably unethical negotiation conduct presented here.
However, attempting to impose such a "fairness" ethical constraint in
situations such as this would be nearly impossible. First, negotiations such
as the one at bar are largely nonpublic in nature, making it extremely
116 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
117 Alvin B. Rubin, supra note 6, at 591-592; see also discussion supra Section II.
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difficult to monitor. 118 Second, assuming that questionable negotiation
behavior could be caught, imposing a fairness standard upon them would
be burdensome and extremely subjective. Calling upon ethical boards to
delve into specific agreements, subjectively analyze their terms and weigh
the competing strengths of each party would inevitably result in uneven and
contradictory application of any type of "fairness" standard. 119 Finally,
commentators proposing such an ethical guideline assume that current
restraints are not adequate to quell such negotiation behavior.
Clearly, social and ethical norms already in existence would serve to
deter Lawyer's conduct in the above hypothetical. As alluded to above,
society has already acted in passing rules to quell behavior that it deems to
be the most egregious. It has done so in the form of Section 2-302 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, which attacks contracts that are so one-sided
that they qualify as "unconscionable" as a matter of law. 120 In addition,
both Lawyer and his client will have to pay the price in the long run for
their conduct. At worst, the small company (P) will decide to breach the
contract in order to save itself long-term losses that resulted from the lop-
sided contract, causing Lawyer's client M increased legal fees in the future.
At best, P will perform under the provisions of the contract, but will realize
how unfavorable the terms were, thus resulting in an increase of
dissatisfaction in M. This "bad-will" will then have an adverse effect on
any future contracts between the two parties. Finally, such "cut-throat"
negotiation behavior by Lawyer will likely spread among his peers, causing
fellow attorneys to negotiate in a more confrontational and antagonistic
manner with Lawyer. 121 This will inevitably hurt Lawyer's ability to garner
better negotiated outcomes on behalf of clients in the future and, in turn,
make it more difficult for Lawyer to attract clients.
Cost-benefit analysis on the part of Lawyer would act as an effective
deterrent to engaging in "unfair" negotiation behavior. While an attorney
who only considered the short-term gains to his client might very well enter
into such a "patently unfair agreement," any rational attorney would have
to consider the long-term ramifications both to himself and to his client.
Cutting such a "cut-throat" deal with P would inevitably cause adverse
results such as the ones enumerated above. Any competent attorney,
especially one attempting to represent zealously the interests of his client,
118 See supra Section IW.A.
119 See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
120 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
121 See discussion supra Section IV.C.
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must take into account these "costs" when evaluating what course of action
to take.122 And while the benefits of such a lopsided contract may seem to
outweigh the costs in the short-term, the opposite seems to be true for the
long-term, especially when one considers Lawyer's client's desire to
maintain a long-term relationship with P. So, while this form of analysis
may not prevent all forms of questionable attorney conduct, it does, when
combined with the established ethical constraints, adequately serve to deter
questionable attorney conduct in the negotiation setting.
VI. CONCLUSION
Private negotiation is largely an informal process that goes relatively
unregulated in terms of the ethical duties and constraints imposed upon
attorneys. Aside from perpetuating a fraud or engaging in illegal activity,
neither the Model Rules nor Model Code speak directly to the ethical rules
governing attorney conduct in negotiations. But this is not to be
misconstrued as an oversight on the part of the drafters; the American Bar
Association's House of Delegates expressly rejected specific rule proposals
that would have placed greater restriction in this area. Rather, this lack of
specific ethical rules should be seen as recognition that the negotiation
process acts in an informal manner, separate and distinct from the formal,
adjudicated settings that occur before a tribunal. In addition, it represents
the significant emphasis placed upon the social and legal ideals of the
adversarial setting and the attorney as the "zealous advocate" for his client.
Many commentators see this absence of controls on this increasingly
important process as perpetuating abuse and injustice within our legal
system. 123 In response, they have offered a number of proposals to be
added to the current established framework of ethical restrictions on
attorney behavior. In sum, these proposals center around placing a
heightened ethical standard on the negotiation process; namely, to impose
honesty, good faith and fairness standards to attorneys acting as
negotiators. In support of their proposals, these commentators point to the
injustices that can occur when one attorney deceives another or uses the
power inherent in his particular position to his competitive advantage.
122 In addition, any client that is also a rational decisionmaker would have to take
into consideration potential long-term costs associated with negotiating any agreement
with another party.
123 See Gordon, supra note 6, at 536.
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However, the reality of the situation supports the notion that the status
quo ethical constraints in negotiation are adequate to protect societal and
legal interests. Admittedly, the formal rules of ethical conduct do not
directly speak to negotiation behavior, and when they do, they only address
the most egregious conduct. However, there are a number of other external
factors apart from the vacuum of a particular negotiation setting that act as
a check on such unethical negotiation behavior. Among these are the
professional forces surrounding a particular attorney's practice, the
developing cooperative nature of negotiation itself and the market forces
that affect a negotiator's decision. Taken together with formal rules of
ethics, these factors insure that ethical standards are met during negotiation,
while still honoring the ideals of the adversarial process and the zealous
advocacy of the client that are deeply imbedded within our existing legal
system. Furthermore, it is apparent from analyzing these proposals that
further good faith and fair dealing duties imposed upon the negotiation
process would likely be unworkable and create more problems than they
could solve.
Finally, this Note acknowledges the unanimous opinion among
commentators that attorneys have a professional duty to conform to a
higher level of ethical standards than the general public. However, that
does not mean that formal ethical rules need to be created in order to
interfere and impose ambiguous social norms upon the relatively effective,
yet informal, practice of negotiation. This is especially true when one
considers a situation where the professional places upon himself a higher
and more efficient degree of ethical constraints in the negotiation process.
When it comes to the issue of creating additional rules to govern this aspect
of attorney behavior, perhaps this is a case where less is more.
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